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Abstract 
Land use changes to sequester carbon also provide “co-benefits,” some of which (for 
example, water quality) have attracted at least as much attention as carbon storage. The 
non-separability of these co-benefits presents a challenge for policy design. If carbon 
markets are employed, then social efficiency will depend on how we take into account 
co-benefits, that is, externalities, in such markets. If carbon sequestration is incorporated 
into conservation programs, then the weight given to carbon sequestration relative to its 
co-benefits will partly shape these programs. Using the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) as an example, we show that CRP has been sequestering carbon, which was not an 
intended objective of the program. We also demonstrate that more carbon would have 
been sequestered had CRP targeted this objective, although the “co-benefits” would have 
increased or decreased. 
 
Keywords: carbon sequestration, co-benefits, Conservation Reserve Program. 
 
 
  
 
CARBON SEQUESTRATION, CO-BENEFITS, AND  
CONSERVATION PROGRAMS 
Capturing and storing carbon in biomass and soils in the agriculture and forest sector 
has gained widespread acceptance as a potential greenhouse gas mitigation strategy. 
Scientists increasingly understand the mechanisms by which various land-use practices 
can sequester carbon, including the introduction of cover crops on fallow land, the 
conversion of conventional tillage to conservation tillage, and the retirement of land from 
active production to a grass cover or trees. However, the policy design for implementing 
carbon sequestration activities is still being developed, and significant uncertainties 
remain concerning the cost effectiveness of carbon sequestration relative to other climate 
change mitigation strategies. 
A potentially important plus in the cost-effectiveness ledger is the fact that the stor-
age of carbon in agricultural soils is likely to come with a number of “co-benefits.” In 
particular, carbon sequestration is not separable from other environmental effects of a 
given land-use practice. For example, the introduction of cover crops or the conversion to 
conservation tillage from conventional tillage also reduces soil erosion, in addition to 
sequestering carbon. The list of potential co-benefits is large and includes wildlife 
habitat, water quality, and landscape aesthetics.1  
A second key feature of carbon sequestration is its nonpoint source characteristic. 
The amount of carbon sequestered in a field or region is costly to measure and monitor 
and protocols for doing so are still being developed, making it difficult to base any 
policies directly on environmental performance (see Mooney et al. 2004 for a discussion 
on the costs of measuring soil carbon credits). In the near term, carbon sequestration 
policies are likely to base payments on land-use practices or other easy indicators of 
carbon-sequestering activities.  
The issue of co-benefits from sequestration activity has received relatively little at-
tention with some important exceptions. Plantinga and Wu (2003) estimated the reduc-
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tions in agricultural externalities from an afforestation program that encouraged the 
conversion of agricultural land to forest in Wisconsin. Using existing benefit estimates, 
they showed that the value of reduced soil erosion and some benefits from enhanced 
wildlife habitat are on the same order of magnitude as the costs of the carbon sequestra-
tion policy. Matthews, O’Connor, and Plantinga (2002) also found that carbon sequestra-
tion through afforestation has significant impacts on biodiversity and that the impacts can 
differ by region. McCarl and Schneider (2001) found reduced levels of erosion, phospho-
rous, and nitrogen pollution from traditional cropland as carbon prices increase.  
Greenhalgh and Sauer (2003) and Pattanayak et al. (2002) showed that the water quality 
co-benefit of carbon sequestration is significant. 
 
Policy Design Issues When Co-Benefits Are Considered 
The co-benefit aspect of carbon sequestration and its nonpoint source nature have 
important implications for policy design. Two policy environments have been discussed 
by economists: carbon trading in a well-functioning carbon market, and some type of 
green payment program akin to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) or the newly 
initiated Conservation Security Program (CSP). Explicit consideration of the co-benefits 
of carbon sequestration in the agricultural and forest sector will need to be treated differ-
ently depending on whether carbon markets are the primary driver of sequestration 
activities or whether a green payment policy is pursued. In the context of carbon markets, 
co-benefits are externalities. To achieve socially efficient trades, we need to determine 
who will be responsible for (or benefit from) the non-carbon effects associated with 
sequestration activities. On the other hand, if we place carbon sequestration in the context 
of agri-environmental policies and consider it as just one of the multiple benefits from 
conservation practices, then a different set of issues arises, including determining which 
benefits are most important; which management practices should be encouraged; which 
geographical areas should be targeted; and whether costs, benefits, or some other criteria 
should be used to direct the allocation of funding.  
A situation in which both green payment programs and carbon markets operate si-
multaneously adds complications. Green payment programs would need to be designed to 
consider interactions between their payments and potential payments from a carbon 
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market. For instance, if recipients of green payments are also eligible to sell carbon 
credits in a market, then practices that yield high levels of carbon sequestration relative to 
other environmental benefits will be particularly attractive to land owners (all else equal), 
potentially resulting in inefficient land-use decisions. If recipients are not eligible for 
both incentives, then the carbon market will act as competition for land in the green 
payment program, with implications for the cost of the program. The issue of coordina-
tion between these two policy approaches is already on the horizon, as some conservation 
programs have been sequestering carbon for many years, and nascent carbon markets are 
emerging (see Butt and McCarl 2004). The CRP program, with its annual budget of $1.6 
billion, has been shown to have large carbon-sequestering potential. This is so despite the 
fact that carbon sequestration was added only in recent signups as an environmental 
benefit in the evaluation of the applications to the program.  
 
Co-benefits in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Given the present existence of green payment programs (e.g., the CRP as well as the 
new CSP), the remainder of this paper explores the co-benefits of carbon sequestration in 
the context of subsidy policies. The example developed here compares carbon sequestra-
tion, erosion reduction, and nutrient reduction benefits across several different methods 
that could be used to implement the CRP program in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
(UMRB). Similar methodologies are used in Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 2004, although 
that study explores the adoption of conservation tillage in the region. 
The UMRB is a highly fertile agricultural region covering 189,000 square miles in 
seven states in the central United States, with 67 percent of the area being either cropland 
or pasture land. The potential for significant co-benefits from carbon sequestration in the 
region is large given that it contains more than 1,200 stream segments and lakes that 
appear on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s listing of impaired waterways. 
The region contained 3,363,000 acres covered under the CRP in 1997, with a total annual 
payment of about $277,500,000 (estimated using the rental payment information of the 
eighteenth signup of the CRP). Average CRP rental rates in Iowa and Illinois are above 
$120 per acre, while Missouri and Wisconsin have the lowest rental rates, with an aver-
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age of about $60 per acre. Minnesota falls somewhere in between, with an average rental 
rate of $86 per acre.  
To estimate the environmental benefits of converting land to CRP, we use the Envi-
ronmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model, version 3060.2 EPIC simulations 
were run for each point in the Natural Resource Inventory database in the region (over 
40,000 points in total) for 10 years, the duration for most CRP contracts. Carbon seques-
tration is measured as the annual average of the total accumulated carbon, that is, the 
difference of the total soil carbon pool at the beginning and at the end of the simulation 
period. Other environmental benefits (reduction of water erosion and nitrogen runoff) are 
the average of the annual measurement, where CRP land is compared to intensive farm-
ing practices typical for the region. For the whole UMRB, the annual average carbon 
sequestration rate for land converted to CRP is 0.487 tons per acre. The first row of Table 
1 provides an estimate of three environmental benefits that result from the existing CRP 
program.  
We next examine how sensitive these environmental results are to different ways of 
implementing the policy. Specifically, we consider how much carbon would have been 
sequestered by the CRP had the program been implemented primarily as (a) a carbon 
sequestration policy or (b) an erosion-reduction policy. Information on rental rates is used 
to analyze two different scenarios with different targeting strategies, so that parcels with 
the highest targeted benefit are chosen until the program funding (the total expenditure 
for the actual CRP program) is exhausted.  
Two results are evident in Table 1. First, if the CRP had been targeted specifically at 
carbon (row 2), then considerably more carbon would have been sequestered relative to 
the actual CRP (row 1). More reduction in nitrogen runoff would also have been 
 
TABLE 1. Total acres and annual change for some environmental indicators as a  
result of land retirement in the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Policy Scenarios 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
(tons) 
Erosion 
Reduction 
(tons) 
N Runoff 
Reduction 
(pounds) 
Acres 
Enrolled 
(acres) 
1. Actual CRP 1,054,000 15,293,000 4,654,000 3,122,000 
2. Targeting carbon 4,141,000 4,699,000 6,365,000 3,926,000 
3. Targeting erosion 988,000 43,744,000 9,399,000 3,972,000 
 
Carbon Sequestration, Co-Benefits, and Conservation Programs /  5 
 
achieved, although the erosion-reduction benefit would have fallen relative to the existing 
program. Second, if the CRP had been targeted specifically at erosion (row 3), then 
significantly more erosion and runoff benefit would have been achieved while carbon 
sequestration levels would have declined slightly. Different regions benefit from the 
program depending on which policies are used to implement the program. Figure 1 
indicates that the actual CRP acres are about evenly spread around the region. When 
carbon is targeted, selected land concentrates in southern Minnesota, eastern Wisconsin, 
and parts of Iowa (Figure 2), and when erosion is targeted, selected land concentrates 
along the Mississippi River (Figure 3).  
To gain more perspective on the total amount of carbon sequestered, suppose there is 
a carbon market with various prices. At a carbon price of $10 per ton, a relatively low 
value used in the literature, the value of the carbon sequestered by the actual CRP is 
about $10 million dollars. This is far less than the actual program costs in the region, 
implying that at this price the carbon market would not be able to induce the change in 
land-use practice that the actual CRP program induced. On the other hand, if the carbon 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Area selected—the actual CRP program 
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FIGURE 2. Area selected—target carbon 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Area selected—target erosion 
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price were over $100 per ton, the value of the carbon sequestered by the actual CRP 
would be about one-third of the program costs. However, if parcels with the best carbon 
potential participate in the market, as theory would predict, then the total value would be 
above $300 million, which exceeds the program costs. In this case, the carbon market 
could replace the actual CRP in the sense of obtaining the same level of carbon sequestra-
tion. However, other environmental benefits might be reduced. This perspective illus-
trates the complication of policy design for carbon sequestration when both green 
payment programs and carbon markets coexist.  
 
Conclusions 
Given that carbon sequestration cannot be separated from many important co-
benefits, policies focused on increasing carbon storage in agriculture and forest lands 
need to carefully consider the consequences of carbon sequestration programs on multi-
ple environmental benefits. To demonstrate the importance of this point, this paper 
presents results from an analysis of a large and potentially rich source of carbon seques-
tration—the UMRB—as well as co-benefits. Our results suggest that had the CRP been 
designed to achieve the greatest carbon for the budget allocated, the land parcels chosen 
for inclusion would be significantly different than either the actual CRP or a different 
kind of program that instead targets soil erosion.  
Numerous design challenges remain in order for conservation policies to elicit so-
cially optimal levels of carbon sequestration, nutrient loads, soil erosion, biodiversity, 
and other landscape amenities. In addition to considering co-benefits, interactions among 
incentives from competing conservation programs (e.g., the CRP and the CSP) and the 
introduction of carbon markets will also present challenges to policy design. Finally, we 
note that the results presented here are based on field-level simulations for a large region 
and that there is ongoing development of EPIC, other environmental models, and eco-
nomic models of costs. As the models evolve, the results of analyses such as the one 
undertaken here may change as well.  
  
 
Endnotes 
1.  There may also be “dis-benefits” such as increased pesticide use with some carbon-
sequestering practices. 
2.  Additional information concerning EPIC can be found in Gassman et al. 2004. 
Details concerning model assumptions and data can be found in Feng et al. 2004.  
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